PART II
Flags,
Lanterns, Rockets and Wires:
Signalling in the American Civil War
~ By ~
Lieutenant
Colonel Iain Standen
British Army, Royal Corps of Signals.
A number of other visual communication techniques were also tried and used
during the Civil War.
The first of these were coloured rockets, or Coston Signals
(after inventor Martha Coston). These were used for communicating in poor weather
conditions, at sea or at night. By applying short phrases to combinations of
rockets, for example:
- White = one
- Red = two
- Green = three etc..
A formal message could be sent.
CLICK HERE for the SCA ~ Night Signals Coston Flares Page
Clearly signal stations on hills using visual signals, be they flags, lantern
or rockets, could not only be seen by neighbouring stations but also by other
troops, especially the enemy. With such a potential intelligence bonanza so
readily available, Signal Corps personnel spent much of their time watching
each others stations, noting down the ‘flag signals’, and then decoding the
communications. The examples of this intelligence battle are numerous. One
member of the US Signal Corps reported:
“I am daily reading the enemy’s signals & get much
good information. [6]
Whilst during the Bermuda Hundred expedition a Union station provided a superb
view of three enemy signal stations, so a regular watch was established over
them for just that purpose. And in operations around Charleston in 1863 the
Confederates employed seventy-six signalmen, twelve of whom did nothing but
read enemy messages. Indeed, although it is difficult to estimate exactly how
much of their work was spent intercepting the enemy’s signals, the respective
Signal Corps must have spent significant amounts of time doing just that. This
suggestion is well supported by the Official Records, which, if they are an
accurate indicator, teem with reports of intercepted Signal Corps Messages.
In order to counter this, both Signal Corps developed ciphers to encode the
information they sent. Myer himself invented a cipher wheel that allowed a
message to be encoded and decoded quickly by sending and receiving stations.
The cipher disk consisted on two concentric disks of unequal size that revolved
on a central spindle and were divided into thirty equal compartments. The smaller
inner disk contained in its compartments letters, terminations and pauses, whilst
the outer disk contained groups of signal numbers to be sent. A pre-arranged
key was then used to align the disks and messaged could be encoded or decoded.
This proved a very successful and provided a high degree of security.
The Confederates too had a cipher system, called by the Confederate War Department the ‘Court Cipher or Vigenere’ . This was a letter substitution code dating back to the 1500s when it had been employed in palace intrigues and inter-state diplomacy during the rise of Europe's modern states. The key points of this cipher are the table and the key. There was also an automated decoding machine invented to speed the process.
The final communications method I wish to look at is the Telegraph. At the
time this was probably the most significant technological development in the
military communications. It was not of course developed during the Civil War
and had been used commercially before. However, it required considerable skill
to operate because to send messages required the use of Morse Code (which has
been invented in 1838). Myer was quick to appreciate the potential of the telegraph
and as early as June 1861 was lobbying the Secretary of War for the Signal Officer
of the Army to be responsible for the, and I quote:
’…telegraphic duty of the army, whether such signal duty
is performed by means of signals transmitted by electricity or by aerial signals.’[7]
Myer gained considerable support for his case and as
the Union Army recovered from the disaster of First Manassas, Myer again wrote
to the Secretary of War:
‘I propose with your permission to organize a telegraph signal train to accompany
the army on its march. The wagons of the train to carry all articles needed
for temporary telegraphic uses in the field; that is, apparatus and supplies
for the use of both electric and aerial telegraphs, rockets and composition
night signals, carefully prepared, packed, numbered and arranged for instant
use.
It is proposed to carry on the train four flying field
telegraphs, the train to be accompanied by, and in charge of, suitable officers
and men, to each of whom his duties shall be assigned, and of whom a proper
proportion shall be selected telegraphists, who shall be instructed also in
the use of the telegraphic and flag signals, and who, employed for the war,
shall be sworn to a faithful discharge of their duties.”[8]
This plan met with considerable support in the higher echelons,
particular proponents being General George McClellan and General Irvin McDowall,
with the final seal of approval coming from the General-in-Chief Winfield Scott
who fowarded Myer’s proposal to the Secretary of War. Unfortunately as so often
happens in the military when trying to establish new ideas and capabilities,
the in built caution and prejudice of the system resulted in the idea receiving
a very lukewarm reception. As a result when an order was issued on 14th
August 1861 from the Secretary of War’s office in which the requirements for
the performance of signal duties was laid down, it included following, rather
non-committal paragraph, on the telegraph:
“Should you find it necessary, you are authorised to
purchase a small telegraph train to aid you to communicate with those points
which cannot be reached by signals, to be paid for out of the telegraphic fund.
[9]
Although this order neither formally agreed, or refused,
Myer permission to create a military telegraph, it did infer some form of permission.
However, what it did not authorise was the money to do anything substantive.
Nonetheless Myer set about organizing his mobile or ‘flying telegraph’ the aspiration
being to:
‘…To have with the Army of the Potomac the apparatus for
establishing at any time a temporary telegraph line of the length of twenty
miles. For this purpose there were to be four flying telegraphs, four double
reels, each reel to carry three miles of insulated wire; instruments and batteries
to be attached to the reels; each flying telegraph to be accompanied by three
operators.’ [10]
In theory such a train could lay 10 miles of wire in four
hours and would have provided a significant enhancement to the capability of
the Union Army. However, Myer was faced with two significant problems. First
the existing telegraph equipment required the transporting of large batteries
to power the lines. Second he required skilled telegraphists to operate the
equipment. Myer therefore wanted to find a way of simplifying the process of
sending telegraph messages and he thought he had found the solution in the Beardslee
Telegraph machine. Invented in 1862 by Mr GW Beardslee of New York, the Beardslee
Telegraph appeared to be the answer to Myer's prayers.
The principal advantages of the Beardslees were that it could
be operate without batteries and by men without knowledge of Morse code. The
key to the Beardslee was that it operated using magnetos. These generated the
power to send electricity over the telegraph wire. In theory, the operator
need only to move the lever to a point on the dial representing the ‘letter’
he wishes to send as part of his message. On the receiving end, the pointer
would move to the corresponding position on the dial. Thus, the information
is sent exactly as it was meant to be sent and, theoretically, without error.
The operator need only copy down the characters he saw "dialed".
Myer received his first Beardslees in May 1862 and they were
deployed in the Second Manassas campaign and at Fredericksburg that winter,
which this map demonstrates. Here you can see a network that links together
Burnsides’ HQ at Phillips House with the commanders of the two of the grand
divisions: Sumner with his HQ at the Delacy House, and Franklin with his HQ
across the river. It also provided a rear link to the Army’s depots on the
Potomac River. Unfortunately for Major Myer, when operating under the pressure
of real-time operations the Beardslee wasn't as promising as many had hoped.
The machine required lots of maintenance, didn't send signals as far as battery
powered devices, and the device did not endear itself to the professional telegraphic
community.
The technical limitations of the Beardslee can be broadly
broken down as follows:
·
A slow rate of transmission
·
An error rate considered
to be higher than the magnetic telegraph
·
A very limited transmission
range.
In truth, these are all inter-related to a high degree.
Although in theory the Beardslee was simple to operate in practice it was very
different. The operators had to do more than just turn the lever to the correct
character on the dial. There was a whole set of steps and procedures for the
operation of the machine. Additionally there was a set of procedures which
had to be followed by all Beardslee operators along a given telegraph circuit
in order for messages to be sent. To many operators the Beardslee, was complicated
and not as easy to learn as promised. Among many, it was considered an "expensive
failure". Repeatedly, it was demonstrated that trained operators using
a conventional telegraph system could send messages faster than most, if not
all, operators using a Beardslee machine. This is due, in part, to the fact
that the Beardslee was never allowed to mature. Operators never gained a similar
familiarity with its operation as did the conventional telegraph operators with
their telegraph equipment.
At this stage we must bring in the other organization within
the Union which was also operating in this field in parallel to the Signal Corp’s
telegraph capability – The United States Military Telegraph or USMT. The USMT
was a civilian organization, (Picture right, shows one at work) which initially
provided only medium and long-range telegraphic communications. The USMT was
developed to operate existing commercial lines and to build new ones as demand
grew. It utilised Morse’s system and although technically under the Quartermaster
General’s command, the Secretary of War, Stanton, effectively exercised direct
control over it. Anson Stager, the pre-war general superintendent of the Western
Union Company, headed the organization, with his principal assistants being
Thomas T. Eckert in the East and Robert C. Clowry in the West.
Both Myer and Stager realised that the distinction between battlefield telegraphy
transmitted by the Signal Corps and longer-range telegraphic messages made little
sense. The result was a battle over roles and missions, with each man laying
claim to all telegraphic communications. Resolving the conflict became urgent
in mid-1863 when, after the Beardlee machines had consistently malfunctioned,
Myer tried to convert to Morse Telegraphy, which meant raiding the USMT’s personnel
and logistical support. The climax came in November 1863 when Stanton ordered
Myer to an obscure job in Cairo, Illinois, and in War Department, Adjutant-General’s
Office, Special Order 499 dated 10 November 1863, directed that the Signal Corps
to surrender its field telegraph equipment to Stager and the USMT. From then
on the Signal Corps employed visual signals only and the USMT never used the
Beardslee machines, relying instead upon the Morse system for all telegraphy.
The picture below, shows one of the USMT’s telegraph wagons.
Throughout the period War Secretary Stanton was a staunch
supporter of the USMT and writing in his annual report at the end of 1863 said:
‘The military telegraph, under the general direction
of Colonel Stager and Major Eckert, has been of inestimable value to the service
and no corps has surpassed - few have equalled - the telegraph-operators in
diligence and devotion to their duties’[11]
Nonetheless the key point here is that functions of the Signal Corps and the
USMT were for the most part very different. The USMT handled logistic, operational
and strategic communications, whereas the Signal Corps operated at the tactical
and, occasionally at the operational level. The latter’s tactical employment
was very evident at Fredricksburg and Chancellorsville where the field telegraph
was widely deployed. However, it was when claim was made to blend the functions
that the conflicts flared up.
In the west these functions were sharper and clearer over the vast distances
concerned. The telegraph stretched forward and backward in the operational
movement of Sherman as he executed his march to the sea. Indeed he was great
fan of the telegraph and even owned his own pocket telegraph set such as the
one shown here. At the same time across that forty mile wide front the flags
and torches of the Signal Corps performed, much the same as did the Confederate
Signal Service, gathering information and co-ordinating the widespread units.
At the same time in the east, the US Signal Corps was relegated to observation
while the United States Military Telegraph operated, at times, right down to
the Brigade level. This was the time of Petersburg and trench warfare. In
a twist of irony, when the war ended, the civilian's who ran the USMT decided
that they wanted nothing to do with the telegraph lines needed by the military
‘out west’ and the service was turned over to the Signal Corps. Much of this
had to do with the lack of the ability of the USMT "brass" to make
money speculating on events in the west.
By the end of 1863 the USMT had created a network linking Washington to various
army headquarters. From there temporary field lines snaked forward to corps
and division headquarters, and in some cases even to advanced field works, Signal
Corps stations, and picket lines. By April 1862 some 3,700 miles were in operation
with another 1,800 by April 1863, another 3,700 by April 1864, another 3,300
by April 1865. When an army advanced telegraphic communications moved apace,
to the marvel of commanding officers. It has even been reported that at times
telegraphers even extended their operations into enemy lines during the heat
of battle. (Whether this was deliberate or as a result of the fog of war is
unclear!) Through this means (which was relatively impervious to atmospheric
conditions and weather), generals directed the movement of their armies. They
could synchronise advances (or retreats) and logistic support, learn about enemy
activity and dispatched reinforcements. The number of telegrams indicates how
heavily the Union armies relied upon the USMT. For the year ending 30 June
1863 Stager reported that the USMT had sent and received 1.2 million messages
ranging in length from ten to more than a thousand words. During the war the
daily average of military and government telegrams was 4,500. By the end of
the war it was estimated that 6.5 million Union messages were sent at the cost
of 40 cents per message!
